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THE SOCIAL MEANING OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS*
James D. Cox'
"Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy
requirements." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak1
"There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule
10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general .... [A]
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance
of success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any
proportion to its prospect of success at trial ... ." Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores'
The two above quotes express very different judgments of
the social value of the representative shareholder suit. In
Borak, the Supreme Court embraced the shareholder suit as
an important medium for achieving compliance with the secu-
rities laws. Blue Chip Stamps warned of the abuses that ac-
company such suits.' Although their difference may well be
attributed to the gulf that separates the Warren Court from
©1999 James D. Cox. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Duke University. An earlier draft of this article was
delivered by me at the Eighth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture at Brooklyn Law
School. I am grateful for the suggestions of the program's commentators,
Messrs. Stanley M. Grossman and Robert H. Mundheim as well as those provided
by Professors Paul Carrington, Deborah DeMott, Paul Haagen and Randall
Thomas.
1 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
2 421 U.S. 723, 737-38 (1975).
' This warning continues to appear in the opinions of the Rehnquist Court.
See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739) (holding that there is no aid-
ing and abetting liability on the grounds that such liability would "'present] a
danger of vexatiousness in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litiga-
tion in general'" with the consequent effect of agreeing to quick settlements and
leading to high precautionary costs for business transactions).
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the more conservative Burger Court,4 the opinions are also a
reflection of contemporary America. Borak was decided at the
height of the most dramatic social revolution in America's
history-a time when the courts, and more particularly private
litigation, were engines for establishing, even redistributing,
legal rights within the country. In contrast, Blue Chip Stamps
reflects the social pendulum's swing in the other direction. By
the mid 1970s, economic growth, not social change, had become
the dominant ideology in American politics.5
This article examines the public image, or expressive val-
ue, of the shareholder suit. My purpose is to determine if many
features common to the conduct of class actions and derivative
suits enhance or detract from shareholder litigation being
understood as a positive social force. The premise driving this
inquiry is my belief that the higher the public esteem of the
shareholder suit, the greater will be its deterrent value. To il-
lustrate why I believe that this premise is correct, consider the
following study by social psychologist Robert Cialdini.6
Cialdini placed flyers under the windshield wipers of cars
and observed how their drivers disposed of the flyers upon
returning to their auto. For one group of drivers, an associate
of Cialdini would pass by the driver, pick up some litter, and
discard the litter in a refuse container. Very few of the drivers
in this group threw the flyer on the street. In contrast, over
one-third of the drivers who did not witness the responsible
behavior of the passerby discarded the flyer onto the street.
The study reflects the well-documented tendency of individuals
" See, e.g., Robert HA. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws:
Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (1984); Thomas L.
Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under the Federal Statutes: Neither a Death
Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 1333 (1980); Lewis D. Lowenfelds, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
This time marked the country's political shift from liberalism to conserva-
tism, hardly an environment for continuing to expand the rights of the "little guy."
6 See ROBERT B. CIALDINI ET AL., 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
201, 221-23 (1991). This study is recounted by Professor Cass Sunstein in his
article, which argues that government should undertake an even larger role than
it has now in nurturing and reaffirming societal norms. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (1996).
[Vol. 65: 1
SOCIAL MEANING OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS
to make social choices by reference to the conduct of others.7
The relevance of the littering study to shareholder litigation is
whether the commencement, prosecution and settlement of a
shareholder suit is like the conduct of Cialdini's responsible
associate. Does the suit's commencement, prosecution and
settlement cause corporate managers (Cialdini's drivers) not
involved in the suit to conform their future behavior to the
normative standards invoked by the suit's plaintiff (Cialdini's
associates), so that managers will place the shareholders' and
investors' interest where they should be rather than irresponsi-
bly discarding them?
In this article, I ask whether shareholder litigation itself is
viewed as a responsible actor so that, much like the passerby,
the suit's existence deters misconduct by others. The continued
existence of the shareholder suit is easier to justify if it has
such an effect. Simply stated, we customarily consider the
deterrent value of private litigation in terms of the sanctions
they provide. Here I add a new consideration, namely, the
social opprobrium that attaches to the suits' defendants as a
consequence of being pursued in a shareholder suit. In this re-
spect, I consider to what extent certain procedural and sub-
stantive features of shareholder suits contribute positively or
negatively to their social meaning. Finally, I suggest reform
measures that will enhance the status of shareholder suits and
hence improve their likely deterrence of misconduct.
I. CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION
Whether and to what extent shareholder suits harbor
reputational impacts upon their defendants is proportional to
the expressive value enjoyed by all shareholder suits. That is,
the message of the individual derivative suit or securities class
" For articles discussing the extensive literature on this point, see generally
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 352-61 (1997); John Scholtz, Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct:




action is affected by the company it keeps with other share-
holder suits. To be sure, the substance of the claim against a
manager has much to do with the sting she will feel from the
suit's charges. The charge that a manager has wrongfully
usurped a business opportunity that belonged to the corpora-
tion can be expected to raise eyebrows higher than the com-
plaint that she wrongfully competed against the corporation.
Since competition is a favored feature of business, a complaint
against competition can easily be seen as predatory practice on
the part of the complainant, whereas cries of taking a corpo-
rate business opportunity ring of theft. Similarly, a charge that
directors were grossly negligent in approving compensation
and perquisites for the firm's senior managers takes on a very
different cast when coupled with charges of cronyism or even
self-dealing. Even a complaint that a manager failed to disclose
adverse confidential information regarding the firm takes on
quite a different meaning when it is also alleged that she
gained privately through insider trading.
Even though a suit's substantive charges have
reputational impacts that depend on the nature of the com-
plaint, the charges are weakened if the medium through which
they are asserted itself lacks a credible reputation. Charges of
usurping corporate opportunities, self-dealing and insider trad-
ing will fail to convey the social condemnation for such mis-
conduct, if the charges are not seen as credible. Much like the
shepherd who cries wolf too frequently, shareholder suits, if
commonly understood to be frivolous, will not in their com-
mencement, prosecution and settlement affirm the social
norms the suit's defendants allegedly violated. Their defen-
dants will instead be seen as the objects of bad luck not deri-
sion. Thus, the procedural context in which corporate and
securities norms are developed and affirmed are of the utmost
significance if those norms are to discipline managers.
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Corporate law is about norm management.' The powers of
corporations to repurchase their shares, to issue securities, and
to combine with one another, as well as the fiduciary stan-
dards of their managers and related disclosure obligations,
reflect contemporary judgments of how best to arrange rela-
tions among owners, managers and capital markets in order to
maximize wealth. The existence of shareholder suits, and their
procedural requirements, are highly visible components of
norm management for corporate law. Most of the content of the
fiduciary obligations of officers, directors and controlling share-
holders, as well as much of the substantive disclosure obliga-
tions of the securities laws, is established through shareholder
suits. This section examines to what extent features of share-
holder suits are consistent with the process of establishing and
affirming norms for business organizations. As discussed be-
low, some features of shareholder suits are destructive to their
role in managing norms for corporate law, whereas other fea-
tures contribute positively toward that role and in turn en-
hance the suit's social meaning.
The inspiration for organizing the following analysis is
Professor Lawrence Lessig's insights on techniques for con-
structing social meaning.' Even though he focuses on how the
social meaning of events is changed-or more positively, con-
" It is perhaps easiest to see corporate statutes as regulating corporate norms.
But the regulation also occurs through court decisions interpreting the bounds of
fiduciary responsibilities. For example, scholars, in examining the Delaware courts'
interpretation of the "good faith" requirement in management buyouts, conclude
that results are highly textured, fact-specific, process oriented, and invariably judg-
mental narratives of the officers' and directors' behavior. Nevertheless, they also
determine that the social force of the opinions is not in their results but the guid-
ance lawyers pass on to their clients from the courts' narratives of acceptable and
unacceptable conduct. See Deborah A. DeMott, Puzzles And Parables: Defining
Good Faith In the MBO Context, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 15, 29-31 (1990); Ed-
ward B. Rock, Saints And Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1094-98 (1997). The lawyer, when confronted by broad stan-
dards such as "good faith" or "reasonableness," will emphasize in her advice the
positive affirmations of director and officer conduct that the lawyer finds in these
narratives, preferring the certain over the speculative course. See Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert K_ Rasmussen, Skewing The Results: The Role Of Lawyers In
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 375 (1997). The result is a
body of norms regarding appropriate conduct for corporate transactions that are
not as highly nuanced as the narratives that produced them.




structed-the importance of his contribution to this article is
his isolation of the ways the expressive value of an event, such
as a sanction's imposition, can be influenced. The four ways he
poses, and around which the following discussion is organized,
are ambiguation, tying, inhibition and ritual. °
A. Ambiguation of the Suits' Mission
Compensation of the injured and deterrence of misconduct
commonly are the joint missions of representative suits. Nei-
ther mission conflicts with the other since to hold one account-
able to those harmed by his misdeeds provides a powerful
disincentive for others to similarly conduct themselves." The
private shareholder suit, as recognized in Borak, serves a pub-
lic function as well as a private one. However, in the corporate
setting, shareholder suits are consistently dismissed when they
fail to serve a compensatory end, even though the goal of de-
terrence would be advanced by the suit's successful prosecu-
tion. Simply stated, compensation is the prevailing objective of
shareholder suits and deterrence, its valuable byproduct.
The most dramatic illustration of this state of affairs is the
"net loss" requirement that applies when the knowing violation
of a criminal statute underlies the derivative suit. When direc-
tors or officers have knowingly engaged in an illegal act, they
no longer are entitled to the presumption of propriety that
normally accompanies the disinterested decisions of manag-
ers." Nevertheless, the directors who knowingly violate the
law are not without a defense. Absent proof that the corpora-
tion suffered a net loss through their illegal act, the suit must
be dismissed. Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to establish that
the harm suffered by the corporation as a consequence of the
10 See id. at 1009-34.
" For a careful consideration of how the distinction between instances in which
an enhanced sanction designed to deter might best be imposed in contrast to the
more frequent instances in which a compensatory sanction will fulfill desirable
deterrence objectives, see Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and
Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer 1997).
2 See, e.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir.
1974). See generally Note, Pleading and Proof of Damages in Stockholders' Deriva-
tive Actions Based on Antitrust Convictions, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 174 (1964).
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misconduct exceeded the benefits it received by their miscon-
duct, the defendant escapes any sanction by a derivative
suit.1
3
A further illustration that compensation is the sine qua
non of the corporate suit is the "vicarious incapacity" principle
whereby the corporation is barred from suing its former con-
trolling shareholder when the present controlling shareholder
acquired his shares from the suit's defendant. The principle
announced here is one of preventing unjust enrichment, 4
since the new controlling shareholder, having purchased con-
trol at a fair price, now seeks to recoup part of the purchase
price from his seller. Deterrence by removing the defendant's
ill-gotten gains is not itself enough to justify the suit's exis-
tence: "If the wrongdoer deserves to be punished, it does not
follow that others are to be enriched at his expense by a court
of equity. A plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own
case, not on the weakness of the defendant's case." 5 The vi-
carious incapacity principle is invoked with equal vigor when
the suit is a derivative suit; the bar applies when the deriva-
tive suit defendant earlier transferred control to a party who
currently controls the corporation. 6 The most frequently in-
voked evidence of the vicarious incapacity principle is the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement for derivative suits,
which requires the suit's plaintiff to have owned the shares at
the time of the defendant's misconduct. 7 The prevalence of
13 See, e.g., Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
See generally Wesley E. Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violations of
Fiduciary Duties Concerning Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313, 333-39 (1965).
*' For a case illustrating how evidence that the new controlling stockholder
bargained for the right to prosecute the suit, see National Union Elec. Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F. Supp. 991, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1980). However, the
suit was not against the former controlling shareholder but against third parties.
The vicarious incapacity principle was unsuccessfully invoked because the new con-
trolling shareholder allegedly would reap a windfall because the harm depressed
the value of the firm before it had assumed control. See id. In contrast, Rock
River Savings & Loan Assoc. v. American States Insurance Co., 594 F.2d 633, 635
(7th Cir. 1979), barred the suit where the suit's defedants had sold their control-
ling block of shares to a new group of owners after public disclosure of their
fraudulent misbehavior but before the corporation had initiated suit.
"' Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024, 1035 (Neb. 1903) (Comm'r
Roscoe Pound).
16 See Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. ill.
1974).
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. § 23.1; DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
1999]
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the contemporaneous ownership rule stems from the reasoning
that if the derivative suit could be maintained by a plaintiff
who did not own her shares when the defendant's breach oc-
curred, the plaintiff could recover for misconduct that did not
harm her. 8
The divide between compensation and deterrence also
exists in substantive areas of corporate law. The most dramatic
illustrations of this are the different approaches courts have
taken in determining whether corporate insiders have
breached their fiduciary duty to their corporate employer when
they trade in its securities on the basis of material nonpublic
information acquired by virtue of their positions. Whereas
Florida conditions the breach on proof of actual injury to the
corporation as a result of the insider's private use of confiden-
tial corporate information, 9 New York and Delaware require
the fiduciary to disgorge any ill-gotten gains without proof of
harm to the corporation."
ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.02 (1987) (comprehensive list of states with this
requirement).
" The most troubling aspect of this reasoning in support of the
contemporareous ownership requirement is that sums recovered in a derivative
suit benefit all the corporation's stockholders, regardless of whether they became
such after the misconduct or even the initiation of the suit. So understood, the
contemporaneous ownership rule is better understood not as a rule to prevent
unjust enrichment but rather as a surrogate for concluding whether the suit's
plaintiff will be an adequate representative. This view of the purpose of the con-
temporaneous ownership rule is questionable because it assumes a shareholder
who seeks to recoup on behalf of the corporation a loss in which he has indirectly
incurred a proportionate loss will be a more adequate representative than one who
seeks to recover without having been proportionally harmed. This assumption
becomes even more problematic when the object of the derivative suit is to require
the corporate fiduciary to disgorge her ill-gotten gains even though the corporation
suffered no harm as a result of the fiduciary's breach. See, e.g., Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (recovery in a
derivative suit of insider's trading profits without proof of harm to the corpora-
tion). In such a case, the derivative suit's plaintiff is no different than the non-
contemporaneous shareholder since neither has suffered a proportional loss as a
consequence of the fiduciary's misbehavior, but each will reap a proportional gain.
" See Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fl. 1975); cf. Freeman v. Decio, 584
F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana state law to conclude that insiders
breach their fiduciary duty only if their use competes with a possible use of the
same information by their employer).
2 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
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The courts' preoccupation with the compensatory rather
than punitive aspects of shareholder suits ambiguates the
suits' expression of social values. Few shareholder actions
entail breaches of a private contract between the plaintiffs and
the suit's defendants. Suits are based on breaches of fiduciary
obligations or disclosure requirements embodied in common
law or state or federal statutes. In all shareholder suits, the
norm invoked has a substantial, if not exclusive, public source.
In theory, therefore, these suits provide a public link to the
norm by requiring resolution in state-funded courts, where
potentially a public voice, the courts, will address each case's
facts through the lens of the applicable norm. Because compen-
sating the injured is a private matter, whereas deterrence is of
public concern, the more squarely the courts place the objec-
tives of shareholder suits in the compensatory sphere, the
weaker the public perception will be that such suits are reflec-
tions of society's condemnation of the misconduct underlying
the suit's charges. To the extent that suits are perceived as
addressing purely private injuries, instead of being understood
to address violations of the public interest in ways that cause
private harms, the public perception will be that derivative
suits are but a subset of the standard commercial dispute
between two warring financial interests.2'
Settlements also play a role in ambiguating the public
character of shareholder suits. The vast preponderance of
shareholder suits that survive pretrial motions result in settle-
ments, not judgments on the merits.22 Settlement breaks the
shareholder suit's link to the state. Whereas the authority to
impose a judgment arises from the law, and by extension soci-
ety, settlements are private contractual matters. Professor
Owen Fiss, in a classic article,' questions the increasing role
of settlement and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
2 Thus, when Alpha, Inc. sues Beta Company for the failure to timely deliver
widgets, the public norm at stake is not as sharply present as if the suit arose
out of alleged price fixing by Beta Company.
' See, e.g., Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever, BUS. LAW TO-
DAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 7 (study of 98 corporate and class action suits over a 2
year period in which the Delaware Chancery Court held a settlement hearing
found that more than 95% of the proferred settlements were approved and
approximately two-thirds of the attorneys' fee applications were granted in full).
' See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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because of their harmful effects on the public norms that un-
derlie the suit:
[Tihe purpose of adjudication should be understood in broader
terms. Adjudication uses public resources and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the
legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their
job is not to maximize the ends of private parties nor simply to se-
cure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embod-
ied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to
interpret those values and to bring reality to accord with them. This
duty is not discharged when the parties settle.24
To be sure, settlements require the approval of the court re-
garding their fairness, reasonableness and adequacy. Few
settlements, however, are rejected and the isolated published
opinions reviewing their terms reflect deference to the
litigants' positions rather than the particular norm invoked in
the suit.25 The court's role is analogous to opining that the
forces of Wellington and Napoleon facing one another at Wa-
terloo were each equal to the task, while withholding any opin-
ion of the issue prompting the conflict between Great Britain
and France. That is, settlement approvals speak to the propor-
tionality of the consideration supporting the contract before the
court, not to the norm that prompted the suit.26 Settlements
are consensual and the practices pursued by the courts in
reviewing a settlement do little to change the private character
of either the suit or its settlement.
24 Id. at 1085.
2 See, e.g., Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings, Inc., No. Civ. A.
13950, 1997 WL 305829 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (approving settlement providing
funds from CEO's estate, even though the court questioned several substantive
conclusions reached by the special litigation committee that had negotiated the
settlement); see also Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); Krasner
v. Dreyfus Corp., 500 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fricke v. Daylin, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 90, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
26 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.14 cmt. e (1992) [hereinafter ALI] (discussing the cost-benefit analysis
the courts customarily employ in considering derivative suit settlements in terms
of financial adequacy whereby the prospective benefits to the corporation are dis-
counted by considerations of direct and indirect costs posed by the suit's continu-
ance as well as the relative uncertainty of result).
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Thus, the public role of shareholder suits is muted, and
indeed obfuscated, both by the characterization of their mission
as the compensation of those harmed by the defendant's mis-
conduct and by the nurturing of settlements through the
courts' extraordinary deference to the bargain struck by the
suit's attorneys. In the end, shareholder suits have but a pri-
vate existence so that in the public's eye they are just another
commercial dispute.
B. Tying Suits to a Failed Objective
Social scientists have long stressed the importance of
"framing" in evaluative decisions. The anchor point that is set
forth significantly impacts the judgment made about a proposi-
tion. The anchor not only fixes the point at which inquiry be-
gins, but it is also frequently the standard for judging the mer-
its of an idea, argument, or social institution.
The public perception of shareholder litigation and its
social meaning has been affected by framing. Complementing
the courts' view that shareholder suits are private suits intend-
ed to compensate injured investors, the academic and political
debate surrounding shareholder suits continues to judge their
social value in terms of whether they result in financial
awards consistent with this compensatory mission. By finding,
as they do, that shareholder suits fail in their compensatory
mission, the studies support a negative view of their social
value. Against the benchmark of compensation, both the deriv-
ative suit and the class action have faired badly in the public
contest for political support. Indeed, some studies openly sug-
gest that many such suits are, at best, misguided because they
produce small awards to their plaintiffs, and are, at worst,
frivolous claims designed to extort an award of attorneys'
fees."
The derivative suit is more vulnerable than the class ac-
tion to assaults on whether it fulfills its compensatory mission.
Two leading studies each conclude that derivative suits yield
no significant wealth effects.28 Within Professor Romano's
27 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995).
8 See Daniel R. Fischel & ichael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and
the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71
1999]
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sample of 139 shareholder suits, 41 resulted in monetary re-
coveries," with the average monetary recovery in derivative
suit being $6 million ($11 million for class action awards)."
The standard recovery represents a very small proportion of
the firm's assets or translates into a small recovery on a per
share basis; in such comparisons, the derivative suit recoveries
are consistently smaller than for class actions." In a larger
sample of derivative suits, Professors Bradley and Fischel
found that the successful derivative suit yields only a slight
positive effect for the firm's stockholders." They conclude that
"derivative suits are not an important monitoring device to
curb managerial malfeasance."33  Additionally, Professor
Romano, on examining stock price reactions to announcements
of the commencement and termination of class actions and
derivative suits, found that stock price changes "do not provide
compelling support for the proposition that shareholders expe-
rience significant wealth effects from litigation."34 Her con-
demnation is strongest for the derivative suit: "To the extent
that derivative suits consistently return less to shareholders
CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991). An earlier study provides a
slightly more optimistic report. See Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination
of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 542 (1980).
29 See Romano, supra note 28, at 61 n.12 (twelve of the suits were derivative
and the remainder were class actions).
30 See Romano, supra note 28, at 61.
31 See Romano, supra note 28, at 61 (derivative suit recoveries constitute 0.5%
of firm assets and class actions, 1.6%). Derivative suit recoveries in 11 of the 12
suits within the study averaged $0.15 per share net of attorneys' fees whereas
class action recoveries in the small subset of the sample (7 of the 39 suits) for
which she could obtain data averaged $2.83 per share net of attorneys' fees. See
Romano, supra note 28, at 62.
32 The events examined were the abnormal returns appearing in stock prices
upon: 1) dismissal of the suit for failure to make a demand (14 firms-negative
returns were not statistically significant); 2) dismissal in response to recommenda-
tion of a special litigation committee (18 firms where none of the price changes on
an individual firm basis were statistically significant and were so only on a port-
folio basis for the date of the announcement, but not for any longer period of
time); 3) suit's continuance after judicial finding that demand was excused or sat-
isfied (10 firms where positive, albeit statistically insignificant, returns were ob-
served); and 4) firms where substantive defense of business judgment rule was
rejected by the court (6 firms where positive but no statistically significant returns
appeared). See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 28, at 280-82.
Fischel & Bradley, supra note 28, at 282.
" Romano, supra note 28, at 65-66.
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than class actions, there is a greater likelihood that more of
these suits are frivolous .. . ."" Thus, she concludes that the
primary beneficiaries of shareholder suits are attorneys."
The findings of Professors Bradley, Fischel and Romano
frame the arguments over which most of the skirmishes lead-
ing up to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995"7 were fought. This legislation introduced procedural and
substantive changes for the securities class action, with the
goal of reducing the incidence of lawyer-driven frivolous class
actions."8 The legislative history of the Reform Act is replete
with empirical reports examining the amounts recovered by
class action members as compared to the damages that were
allegedly in dispute. 9 Those championing the cause of the
class action marshalled data to demonstrate that class mem-
bers receive a significant portion of their losses in settle-
ments, 0 whereas those arguing that class actions are simply
strike suits emphasized the large number of suits settled with-
in the policy limits of applicable D & 0 insurance,4' and more
generally noted that securities class actions produce small
rewards to class members when compared to their alleged
damages.42
One may well conclude that the passage of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act is the most visible symbol of
Romano, supra note 28, at 61.
See Romano, supra note 28, at 65. This condemnation is further supported
by her conclusion that the nonpecuniary forms of relief are cosmetic and under-
taken not for their intrinsic benefits, as she found no empirical support for their
benefits. See Romano, supra note 28, at 63.
37 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. I (1995)).
", See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
104-369, at 1-2 (1995).
3' See Securities Litigation Reform Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 309-
14 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings]; Private Litigation Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 121, 153, 739-50 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Hearings].
40 See Princeton Venture Research, Inc. Study, in 1993 Hearings, supra note 39,
at 153.
41 See 1993 Hearings, supra note 39, at 139 (statement of Vincent E. O'Brien).
42 See Federick C. Dunbar & Vinita M. Juneja, Recent Trends II: What Ex-
plains Settlements in Shareholder Actions?, in 1993 Hearings, supra note 39, at
750 tbl.3 (reporting average attorneys fees of 31.32% of settlements).
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the expressive value of the securities class action. Judged by
the standard of compensation, the securities class action was
seen as so wanting that Congress constrained their use by en-
acting restrictive procedures that applied only to securities
litigation. Existing class action procedures were not believed to
assure that the suit's defendants had violated the securities
laws. Simply stated, procedural rules existing prior to the
Reform Act were seen as confirming the belief that being a
defendant in a securities class action was nothing more than
legalized bad luck. And worse, this phenomenon was labeled by
the Congress as impeding capital formation and entrepreneur-
ial activities.
Tying the measure of the shareholder suit's social value to
its compensatory functions most certainly will condemn it to
failure. Certainly this is the case for derivative suits. Consider
the characteristics common to derivative suits. Amounts in-
volved in derivative suits typically are quite small in terms of
the firm's overall value. The domain of the derivative suit are
charges for which a demand on the board of directors can be
excused. Such cases overwhelmingly involve self-dealing behav-
ior-wasteful executive compensation, misappropriating corpo-
rate opportunities, or gaining on dealings with the corpora-
tion-which by their nature tend to involve small sums of mon-
ey relative to the overall value of the firm. To be sure, manag-
ers who thwart a lucrative hostile bid pose potentially large
value suits based on their alleged self-interest, but the deriva-
tive or class action suit in such cases customarily results in
equitable relief and not a financial recovery.43
' Not only does the derivative suit customarily provide small recoveries, but
when the recovery is on behalf of a publicly traded company this necessarily en-
riches any shareholder who became such after the suit was commenced. In the
public corporation, share ownership changes daily so that those who own their
shares when the impacts of the defendantfs wrongdoing occurred will not be the
same owners when damages are recovered. The post-wrongdoing set of sharehold-
ers are not unjustly enriched because theoretically a portion of their purchase
price reflected the expected value of the derivative suit being prosecuted on behalf
of their corporation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see that they have been injured
by the defendant's wrongdoing; they are instead recovering on a purchased chose
in action. The view that the post-wrongdoing shareholders have purchased a valu-
able cause of action, however, is greatly weakened when the nature of the suit is
such that any recovery is likely to be small relative to overall share values, so
that any recovery can be seen as having no impact on shareholder wealth. So
viewed, the recovery does not compensate later arising shareholders because of the
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The public image of the securities class actions is no better
than that of the derivative suit. As seen earlier, securities class
actions are understood by many to be lawyer-driven suits
where most recoveries fall within the limits of the company's
D & 0 insurance policy." Suits are brought only when the
amount involved is expected to be sufficiently rewarding for
the class action lawyer. Thus, it is not surprising that there is
significant under enforcement of fraudulent offerings of small
issuers.45 Moreover, the fact that a significant percentage of
cases involve settlements of less than $2 million feeds the view
that nuisance, rather than actual harm, prompts many suits to
be initiated.46 This image is further reinforced for both deriva-
tive suits and class actions when the sole benefit garnered by
the suit is a nonpecuniary award to the shareholders but cash
for their lawyers.
47
The image of the securities class action may well be differ-
ent if there were more complete data on its effects. Many secu-
rities class actions yield not only substantial amounts to the
class, but significant amounts for many of the individual class
smallness of the discounted value of a future recovery is such that the rational
shareholder would not have taken it into consideration in purchasing the shares
and the ultimate recovery is so small that it does not materially alter the value of
the firm. See James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Bound-
aries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984).
"See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
'5 See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 948 (1996) (in study
of fraud claims arising from initial public offerings, the vast number of such cases
involved securities offerings in excess of $10 million in which alleged losses were
at least $5 million).
's See Grundfest, supra note 27, at 742-43.
', For evidence of the frequency of such nonpecuniary settlements, see Romano,
supra note 28, at 61; see also Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the
Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Toward a Better Informed Debate, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 146 (Summer 1985). A more recent study not only finds
substantial evidence of nonpecuniary settlements in class actions generally, but
concludes the settlements are beneficial and justifiable conclusions to the litigation.
See Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (Autumn 1997). For classic analyses of the dark in-
centives that prevail in representative suit litigation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Un-
derstanding The Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Pri-
vate Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669 (1986); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Pro-




members.4" To be sure, small recoveries, especially those
within the coverage limits of any available insurance policy,
are consistent with the strike suit thesis, which holds that
baseless actions are brought by unscrupulous attorneys seek-
ing a fee award as the price for the suit's dismissal. On the
other hand, a recovery limited to the amount of any available
insurance policy is also consistent with the idea that the defen-
dants have no other available funds to contribute toward a
larger settlement or possible judgment. Even the latter view
projects a disturbing image of the securities class action. Can a
suit that recovers only from the neutral D & 0 carrier be seen
as being compensatory, when the amount recovered is so small
in relation to the harm suffered by the class?4 9 Even less ap-
pealing is the view that such suits deter misconduct because
the recovery comes from a innocent insurance carrier rather
than the wrongdoers themselves.
The data regarding the role of insurance in settlements
and the frequency of dismissals of shareholder suits" can lead
to a more positive view of shareholder suits if the anchor point
of the analysis is the inherent indeterminancy of rights that
can only be determined through litigation. Consider, for exam-
ple, that the disclosure demands of the antifraud provisions
are continually evolving case-by-case through private and SEC
enforcement actions. Standards such as what are material
" See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,
104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2088-97 (1995) (50 largest claimants in 82 class actions had
an average loss of $597,000 with largest and second largest claimants accounting
for 13.1% and 6.7%, respectively, of the total in a subsample of 20 suits). For a
discussion of the role that institutional investors have played since the passage of
the lead plaintiff provision of the 1995 Reform Act, see Keith L. Johnson, Deter-
rence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation: The Role of Institutional
Investors, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (Autumn 1997).
"' The complaint of underrecovery by class members is by no means beyond
dispute. Though there are many cases whose settlements are quite small, there
remain a good number that produce large settlements. More significantly, there is
empirical data supporting the conclusion that class members recover through set-
tlement a significant portion of the damages they have suffered. See Willard T.
Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 491, 499 tbl.2 (1996) (using conservative assumptions regarding percentage of
resales by class members trading during the period of fraudulent reporting, 83% of
settlements studied occurred within the damages estimated under the two-trader
model).
5 See Grundfest, supra note 27, at 742-43.
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omissions or misstatements, as well as what constitutes their
reckless commission, are inherently vague, thereby inviting ad
hoc determinations. The opaqueness of the antifraud rule most
certainly invites many long shot suits,5' so that what some
see as abuses within this process can also be understood as the
evolution of federal common law around inherently vague
norms.52 Therefore, the prevalence of settlement within the
bounds of available insurance, or even the frequency of dis-
missal of shareholder suits, are predictable consequences of the
fact that, in most corporate disputes, the contesting rights are
inherently indeterminate. It is interesting to speculate why
this perspective has not gained as much force as the more
negative view described above. The prevailing view, however,
is one that lends itself to measures of costs and benefits. To
the extent that objectivity is associated with measurement and
each is a desideratum within society, the preoccupation with
the compensation provided by shareholder suits is understand-
able since compensation is measurable but deterrence is not.
Shareholder suits are thus tied to a metric, i.e., the compen-
sation they provide, that most surely measures their failure,
not their success.
51 See Charles M. Yablon, The Good, The Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1996) (Rule 11 standards
should reflect social benefits of permitting long-shot suits); cf Rock, supra note 8,
at 1097-99 (compensation is justified for even unsuccessful shareholder suits be-
cause they nonetheless produce normative guidance of acceptable conduct).
" Here we might well take note that the most likely weapon to address spu-
rious representative suits should be Rule 11 sanctions against the suit's attorneys
and plaintiffs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. There have, however, been few such sanc-
tions for securities suits. See, e.g., Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d
Cir. 1994) (copycat complaint); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991)
(suit continued despite repeated warnings from the court the complaint was poorly
supported by the facts). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
amended the securities laws to require the presiding judge in all securities actions
to make a finding whether Rule 11 was violated. See Securities Exchange Act
§ 27(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. III 1994); id. § 78u-4. For a recent fee award
under newly enacted section 27D(c)(2), see Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. The
Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The most point-
ed criticism of Rule 11 has been its impact on law reform by discouraging suits
pursuing novel theories or extensions of existing norms to unusual factual pat-
terns. See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 331, 333-35 (1988).
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C. Applying the Right Inhibitions
The social meaning of an act can be shaped by the inhibi-
tions imposed around it. By inhibiting certain behavior, the
occurrence of which would otherwise create or reinforce a
disfavored social meaning, we shape our perception of the act
itself.53 Professor Lessig reminds us that segregated neighbor-
hoods would be reinforced if real estate brokers were permitted
to disclose the racial composition of a neighborhood; the Fair
Housing Act54 bars such disclosure and thus reduces the like-
lihood that the selection of a new home will be made on the
basis of racial considerations.55 Similarly, many substantive
and procedural requirements provide important inhibitions
that contribute positively to the view of shareholder suits being
seen as important social mechanisms.
The most important inhibition that can be used to nurture
positive deterrent effects flowing from shareholder suits are
pretrial procedures that lead to the dismissal of baseless suits.
Any pretrial procedure will be less than perfect so that both
Type I and Type II errors may occur, but not in equal num-
bers.5" To the extent that pretrial procedures bias results so
that meritorious cases tend to survive, a suit's continued prose-
cution or settlement can be expected to have a greater deter-
rent value than if there were no pretrial procedures so that on
average there would be a lower likelihood that any suit's com-
plaint addressed actual misconduct. Because the class action
aggregates a large number of claims such that the amount in
controversy is of great significance to the defendant, courts
have long appreciated the class action's power to extort size-
able settlements even if the suit's merits were questionable.
For example, in Grady v. Rhone-Poulen Rorer Inc.,5" Judge
Posner decertified a plaintiff class believing it was inappro-
priate to subject the defendant to the outcome of a single jury
trial when "the preliminary indications are that the defendants
are not liable for the grievous harm that has befallen the mem-
5 See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1013, 1032.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1992).
5 See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1013.
5 See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type 1I Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996).
57 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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bers of the class." " One early response to the enormity of the
amount in controversy once a suit was certified as a class was
that trial courts, in deciding whether to certify the suit, would
undertake a preliminary inquiry into the suit's merits. This
practice was rejected by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin,59 which held that Rule 23 does not condition
class certification on the requirement that the plaintiff plead
facts that will prevail on the merits. Rather, the Court held
that certification depended upon whether questions of law or
fact common to members of the class predominated." Even
though Eisen bars formal consideration of the merits as the
litmus test for certifying the suit as a class action, a suit's
merits are not divorced from the district court's class certifica-
tion decision.6'
The in terrorem effect upon the defendant, and hence upon
the suit's settlement value, of class certification can be ad-
dressed through pretrial motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, which provide important tests of the suit's value.
However, a minority of the circuits interpret Eisen as requiring
the suit's certification as a class should be resolved before
ruling on other pretrial motions.62 Regardless of whether the
" Id. at 1300. Judge Posner thus side-steps Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974), by basing the holding on the class action not being "superior to
other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" as re-
quired by Rule 23(b)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Costano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). For a decision viewing Rhone-
Poulenc as inconsistent with Eisen, see Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
59 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
60 See id. at 177-78.
61 Eisen does permit courts to go beyond the pleadings to determine whether
common issues are in fact likely to predominate. See General Tel. Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) ("[Slometimes it may be necessary
for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certifica-
tion question."); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) ("[T]he
class determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action.' . . . Evaluation
of many of the questions entering into determination of the class action questions
is intimately involved with the merits of the claims.") (citation omitted); Castano,
84 F.3d at 744 ("A district court certainly may look past the pleadings to deter-
mine whether the requirements of rule 23 have been met.").
62 See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd in part, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 64 (3d Cir.
1980); Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 555 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977). But
see Player v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 841 F.2d 1123 (4th Cir. 1988); Floyd v. Bow-
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court rules on the defendant's motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment before or after it renders its decision as to
whether to certify the class, neither motion subjects the
plaintiffs' allegations to the same scrutiny as an assessment of
the suit's merits, a practice Eisen bars.
Pursuant to the heightened pleading requirement intro-
duced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995,
private securities suits can now be subject to a preliminary
assessment of their merits as part of the court's response to
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Under the Reform Act, the
complaint must specify not only each statement alleged to have
been misleading and the reasons the statement is mislead-
ing,' but it must also state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with scienter.'
The Reform Act therefore rejected notice pleading that has
been a fixture of federal civil procedure since 1938 and re-
placed it with pleading standards that invite the court to un-
dertake a much closer scrutiny of the plaintiff's allegations and
their factual support in ruling on the defendant's motion to
dismiss.65
The degree to which district court judges will scrutinize
the complaint under the Reform Act's heightened pleading
requirements varies widely among judges and reflects, among
other things, their own perceptions of contingency fee litiga-
tion, and especially securities class actions. Overall, the Re-
form Act's heightened pleading requirement will lead to suits
en, 833 F.2d 529, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1987); Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 543-45
(9th Cir. 1984). Of special note is the more recent Seventh Circuit decision sug-
gesting a switch from the earlier position taken in Rutan. See Cowen v. Bank
United of Tex., 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Rule 23(c)(1) . . . requires certif-
ication as soon as practicable which will usually be before the case is ripe for
summary judgment. But 'usually' is not 'always' and 'practicable' allows for wiggle
room.").
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (Supp. 1996). In the case of an alleged misrepre-
sentation that is made on information and belief, "the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." Id.
See id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
For an insightful analysis of how the complaint can, making use of publicly
available information, meet the Reform Act's pleading requirements in an open
market fraud case and, hence, how the suit's merits become entangled with the
pleading requirements, see Elliott J. Weiss, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the
Procedural Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998).
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that survive a motion to dismiss on average having more merit
than suits possessed under the pre-Reform Act notice pleading
requirement. This in turn should lead to the private securities
action enjoying a higher status than existed prior to the Re-
form Act. Moreover, the Reform Act's bar to any discovery
while the defendant's motion is pending further enhances the
suit's image.6" The filing of a securities suit is no longer seen
as the medium for the plaintiff to gain access to the defen-
dant's records so that the plaintiff can determine if there is a
basis to allege the defendant violated the securities laws. Thus,
whatever impact the Reform Act has had on preventing merito-
rious securities claims from being redressed, there is every
reason to believe its provisions have also inhibited many ques-
tionable suits, so that those suits that do survive the
defendant's motion to dismiss convey more credible claims of
misbehavior.
Through its demand requirement, the derivative suit also
involves an important mechanism by which the suit's merits
may be assessed. In its contemporary formulation, however,
the demand requirement fails as a screening mechanism. The
ultimate issue the demand requirement places before the court
is whether the corporation's board of directors can impartially
assess whether the derivative suit is in the corporation's best
interest. When a majority of the directors are found sufficiently
disinterested in the suit, their good faith determination that it
should be dismissed is accepted by the court. Good faith in the
context of the demand, however, is an intriguing standard. If
good faith were determined through a searching inquiry of the
directors' reasons for urging the suit's dismissal-their legal
conclusions and the facts that support them-then the good
faith standard would permit the court to evaluate preliminarily
the claims raised in the derivative suit. Usually, however,
courts avoid this inquiry and focus their attention upon the
procedures the directors pursued, rather than the reasoning
invoked, in supporting their dismissal recommendation. 7 In
£6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1996).
See, e.g., Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that good faith is determined by the procedures and methodology em-
ployed and not the report's contents). The leading case for this position is Auer-
bach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633-34, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
928-29 (1979). Not all courts so limit their review. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., 2
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cases when the demand is excused on the basis that a majority
of the directors are so linked to the suit or its defendants that
they cannot reasonably be believed to be impartial, there is no
formal mechanism for assessing the suit's merits. On the other
hand, the court's finding that bases exist for excusing a de-
mand on the board forces most derivative suit litigation into
areas involving instances of self-dealing behavior by executives
rather than broad attacks on executive decision making. Cer-
tainly a process that can lead to a finding that the facts suffi-
ciently implicated a majority of the directors in the alleged
self-dealing so as to excuse a demand is itself a screening pro-
cess of sorts. With the demand requirement so viewed, its
operation rivals the "pleading with particularity" requirement
that applies to securities suits.
Screening the suit's merits provides an important bulwark
against the continuation of strike suits past the demand stage.
Upon satisfying the demand requirement, the derivative suit
can more easily be understood to reflect a public condemnation
of the conduct that is the subject of the suit." The court's ear-
ly involvement in the facts supporting the derivative suit com-
plaint provides an important pre-trial screening mechanism.
Both the Reform Act's pleading requirements and the deriva-
tive suit's demand requirement have positive winnowing effects
so that shareholder suits that meet these pretrial demands
enjoy greater merit than if these requirements did not exist. 9
CORPORATIONS § 15.8, at 15.7-.80 (1995). In special instances, the absence of good
faith has been based on other considerations. See, e.g., Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d
398 (11th Cir. 1994) (directors failed to exercise good faith because they relied on
the attorney who had previously represented the suit's defendant); Thorpe v.
CERBCO, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,416 (Del. Ch. 1991) (decision to oppose
suit was driven by the wishes of the controlling stockholder and not the directors'
good faith judgment).
" The current operation of the demand requirement provides much closer and
sweeping scrutiny of the suit's pleadings and supporting affidavits than may occur
under contemporary pretrial motions such as a motion for summary judgment or
motion to dismiss. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohe-
sion, 48 LAV & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 118-120 (Summer 1985).
69 However, both do so with the serious likelihood of causing meritorious ac-
tions to be dismissed because the securities class action plaintiff cannot meet the
Reform Act's particularity requirement or the derivative suit plaintiff cannot allege
facts sufficient to excuse a demand on the board of directors so that the directors'
judgment that the suit be dismissed would be unassailable should the plaintiff
make a demand on the board.
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The conditions for availability of insurance and indemnifi-
cation merit consideration as to whether their limitations pro-
vide the right inhibitions. Overall, there is something of a
mixed message that one derives from the standard
source-insurance-for the funds obtained through settlements
or judgments of shareholder suits. In these suits, insurance
plays as important a role as it does in other types of litigation.
Testimony that preceded the enactment of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act estimated that 96 percent of securi-
ties class action settlements were for amounts within the lim-
its of available insurance coverage.7" One implication of this is
that those individuals who are actually responsible for viola-
tion rarely are required to recompense those they have harmed
from their own funds. Even when there is no insurance, the
employing corporation's vicarious liability for the misstate-
ments of its officers or directors produces a joint liability be-
tween the active wrongdoing officers or directors and their
passive employer. Because the employing corporation is more
likely to have greater resources to contribute toward the suit's
settlement or judgment, the active wrongdoers rarely contrib-
ute toward the suit's settlement.7'
There are some distinctive inhibitions within the law that
nevertheless prevent the complete insulation of officers and
directors from accountability for their misconduct.72 The scope
of the standard D & 0 insurance policy and state indemnifica-
tion statutes assure that any award arising from an officer's or
director's knowing or willful misbehavior will not be paid by
the insurer or indemnified by the employer. Among the numer-
ous exclusions to the standard D & 0 policy are those for dis-
7o See supra note 41.
71 The infrequency of holding individuals accountable for their misconduct as
officers or directors also appears in government enforcement actions. See Stephen
Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal Penalties, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 139-40 (Summer 1997) (citing statistics that during
the past 17 years the Department of Justice has indicted for antitrust violations
nearly as many individuals as corporations, but only rarely are individuals the
object of either Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission civil actions).
" For an analysis of how such matters as the "claims made" feature in most
D & 0 policies, coverage disputes with the insurer, as well as the risk assess-
ments by insurers prior to issuing a policy in combination dampen concerns that
the availability of D & 0 insurance weakens the deterrent effect of private litiga-
tion, see James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Miscon-
duct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 26-27 (Autumn 1997).
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honesty, a breach in which the director or officer has reaped a
personal gain, and intentional wrongdoing. 3 Similar restric-
tions are likely under contemporary indemnification statutes,
which typically condition indemnification on the officer's or
director's having acted in "good faith."4 Thus, in Waltuch v.
Conticommodity Services, Inc.,75 the Second Circuit barred an
officer who knowingly engaged in a series of manipulative acts
from obtaining indemnification rights under the broad indem-
nification provision of the company's articles of incorporation.
The court reasoned that the Delaware indemnification statute
conditioned permissive indemnification on the agent acting in
good faith.
Both the standard insurance exclusions and the "good
faith" requirement of state indemnification statutes, therefore,
reinforce the view that those who intentionally misbehave are
personally accountable for the harm they cause, even though
as a practical matter the misbehaving officer or director may
lack the funds to fully compensate the plaintiffs. More impor-
tantly, the D & 0 policy's exclusions and state indemnification
statutes' conditions reflect a public judgment that certain types
of conduct are beyond the pale of legitimate business practices
and should be condemned. Thus, suits to redress such officer
and director misconduct are more sharply seen as vindicating
public not private values.76
Moreover, the D & 0 policy is not the umbrella everyone
believes it to be. First, the standard policy is a "claims made"
73 See RALPH C. FARRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION:
BESIEGING THE BOARD § 13 (1997) (thorough review of the provisions of the typical
D & 0 policy).
74 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)(b) (1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 722(a)(c) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.51(a) (1984).
71 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
7' Even though we can see the exclusions as tying the suit to a strong social
norm, the incentive of the private attorney is to loosen those moorings by alleging
conduct that does not fall within the policy's exclusions. Thus, rarely do pleadings
allege that the officers and directors knowingly committed the alleged misrepresen-
tations; the complaint customarily also charges the misrepresentation was reckless-
ly committed. By so broadening the charges, the insurance policy remains a viable
source for funding the settlement or judgment. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud,
The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 1995 DUKE L.J.
255, 258-60 (1995). This practice has the harmful effect of weakening the social
meaning of suits because it mischaracterizes the misconduct so that it falls within
the sphere of an acceptable and insurable business practice.
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policy covering only claims made during the policy's life. Thus,
the standard claim can, and generally does, arise from misbe-
havior that occurred in a year earlier than that in which the
current policy was written. It is standard procedure among
insurers to require those who seek coverage to complete a
lengthy application that inquires into events and activities that
may give rise to a claim against the policy.77 Even though
there may be a rich D & 0 policy, the insurer may deny cover-
age on the ground that the insured concealed important infor-
mation when it applied for insurance.78 Certainly disputes
between the insured and the insurer regarding coverage under
D & 0 policies occur with sufficient frequency to suggest that
coverage is by no means automatic.79 Further bases for cover-
age disputes involve matters such as whether the misconduct
giving rise to the claim fell within one of the enumerated ex-
clusions in the policy. In combination, these considerations
warn the manager that it is unwise to consciously misbehave
on the assumption that the firm's D & 0 policy will shield her
from any responsibility for the harm her misconduct causes
others.
It thus appears that socially desirable inhibitions exist
that contribute to shareholder suits serving a valuable deter-
rent to misbehavior by corporate managers. Both the Reform
Act's heightened pleading requirement and the courts' deci-
sions excusing the demand requirement for derivative suits
provide screening mechanisms that tend to eliminate weak
suits. Insurance and indemnification provisions and practices
also contain important inhibitions that address the fears of a
moral hazard that may result if managers could then believe
that broad insurance or indemnity coverage would bear the
ultimate burdens of their delicts.
"' For a compilation of such applications, see THE WYATT CO., SUMMARY OVER-
VIEW OF TYPICAL PROVISIONS OF D & 0 POLICIES (1993).
" Similarly, former officers frequently are not favored sons when they seek
indemnification from the board that ousted them. See, e.g., Mr. Cough-It Up, DEL.
LAW WKLY., June 28, 1999, at 6 (former CEO of Sunbeam was successful in suit
seeking indemnification for costs of his defense in 17 pending suits alleging he
had committed numerous misrepresentations of earnings during his tenure as
CEO).
7' See WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, WATSON WYATT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
LIABILITY SURVEY 46 (1996) (among 1010 surveyed companies, 15% of those with
D & 0 claims reported they had coverage disputes with the insurer).
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D. Beyond Ritual: The Private Nature of Public Settlements
Lessig's fourth technique for shaping social meaning is
through rituals that induce actions that are likely either to
support or weaken a particular social meaning." His exam-
ples include supporting patriotism and political orthodoxy by
allowing schools to maintain the voluntary practice for stu-
dents to stand and salute the flag as well as our singing the
national anthem at sporting events.8 The most visible and
important ritual for the shareholder suit is the procedural
requirements that accompany the suits' initiation and settle-
ment.
The public character of the shareholder suit is heightened
by some important recent procedural developments. In the case
of securities class actions, under the Reform Act courts must
follow a process that can lead to the appointment of a lead
plaintiff whose powers include selecting and retaining class
counsel.8 2 The Reform Act provides a rebuttable presumption
that the member of the class with the largest financial stake in
the relief sought is the "most adequate plaintiff" 3 Though
the history of the lead plaintiff provision remains short, there
have been some highly publicized instances in which the inde-
pendence of the lead plaintiff vis-A-vis class counsel suggests
that there is a new "gun" in town.'
There can be little doubt that the lead plaintiff provision
has shaken the quiet life of the class counsel. More significant-
ly, the lead plaintiff provision alters the perception of the secu-
rities class action as being a lawyer-driven suit. The lead
plaintiff provision replaces the tainted image of the plaintiff as
figurehead with that of the plaintiff as a true functioning rep-
resentative of the class with statutory powers over the suit's
attorney. 5 The lead plaintiffs large financial stake provides
" See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1013-14, 1032-34.
'1 See id.
82 The appointment of a lead plaintiff is also within the presiding court's power
in other class actions not involving securities violations. See generally Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 48, at 2105-06.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(b)(iii) (Supp. III 1994); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(iii).
See generally Johnson, supra note 48, at 159 (reporting there have been lead
plaintiff appointments in only 8 of 105 surveyed securities class actions).
5 Thus, courts have rejected coalitions of individual investors in favor of a
single institutional investor, reasoning that a group of individual lead plaintiffs
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much needed incentives with respect to the suit's diligent pros-
ecution, tempers the award of attorney's fees, and curbs the
continued prosecution of unmeritorious suits, since the harm of
such suits to the corporation is also harmful to the interests of
the lead plaintiff. Moreover, the court's appointment of the
lead plaintiff removes the self-selecting, even professional,86
image of the suit's plaintiff. By virtue of the court's power to
appoint the suit's representative, the suit gains an important
public connection. As a result, the selection of a lead plaintiff
not only enhances the legitimacy of the suit's basis but also
raises its overall public character.8 7
In contrast to the securities class action, derivative suit
plaintiffs remain self-selecting and derivative suit procedures
do not systematically invite other shareholders to become the
suit's plaintiff. As seen earlier, only through satisfying or ex-
cusing the demand requirement does the plaintiff earn the
right to prosecute the action.88 The derivative suit exists be-
cause the real plaintiff, the corporation, is disabled by its
board of directors' self-interest to terminate the derivative
suit.89 Courts customarily find such director self-interest ex-
would "inevitably delegate more control and responsibility to the lawyers for the
class and make the class representatives more reliant on the lawyers." Gluck v.
Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1997). See generally Steven M.
Pesner & Andrew J. Rossman, Choosing Lead Plaintiffs Under the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act: Who Shall Lead, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1999). But it
may not be groups as such that are disfavored in contesting petitions to serve as
a lead plaintiff. See Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sciences Corp., 1999 WL 339040 (E.D.
Va. May 21, 1999) (group of pension funds chosen over less cohesive and reliable
group of individuals).
" The deprofessionalization of the plaintiff also appears in other Reform Act
provisions which bar the practice of compensating the suit's plaintiff for efforts on
behalf of the class and limit to five times in three years the number of suits for
which a person can serve as lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(2)(vi), (3)(vi)
(Supp. 1997).
817 A collateral effect of the court's appointment of a lead plaintiff would seem
to be that there would no longer be cause for the court to employ a bidding pro-
cess to select counsel for the suit as has occurred in some instances. See, e.g., In
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991). In contrast, the practice of
selecting lead counsel through sealed bids appears to reduce the suit to a private
chattel. See Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688,
699 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
8' See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
8' See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 960-61
(1982) (plaintiffs legitimacy to represent the corporation's interest regarding suit's
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ists when the derivative suit plaintiff successfully pleads that
the challenged conduct is so extreme that it is beyond the
protection of the business judgment rule or when a majority of
the board's current members are either so connected to the
challenged transaction, or financially dependent on those that
are the suit's defendants, that they cannot be expected to act
impartially if they were called upon to assess whether the
corporation's interests would be served by the suit's prosecu-
tion. These inquiries customarily occur through the court's
decision as to whether the suit's plaintiff is excused from mak-
ing a demand on the board of directors as a precondition to
maintaining the suit." Even in those jurisdictions that have
adopted the universal demand requirement, where a demand is
required in virtually all derivative suits, the court's decision
whether to abide by the directors' resulting recommendation
that the suit be dismissed will be guided by these same consid-
erations.91 Overall, the derivative suit lacks the same legiti-
mizing of the plaintiff as occurs with the securities class
action's lead plaintiff. The demand requirement does not re-
quire an inquiry into whether the derivative suit plaintiff has
continuance is second to that of an independent body of directors).
"0 The most intricate of the approaches are those found in Delaware and New
York. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991) (futility found where
well-pleaded complaint overcomes presumption of director disinterest and honesty
or creates reasonable doubt that the challenged transactions were the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment); see also Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 200-
01, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040-41, 644 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127-28 (1996) (complaint alleged
with particularity that a majority of the directors was interested in the challenged
transaction, that the majority did not fully inform themselves about that transac-
tion, and that the transaction was so egregious on its face "that it could not have
been the product of sound business judgment of the directors.").
" The source of the universal demand requirement is the American Law
Institute's corporate governance project. See ALI, supra note 26, at § 7.03. The
Model Business Corporations Act now also embraces universal demand. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1989). For states adopting the Model Act's approach, see
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.42. An enthusiastic adoption of ALI's recommen-
dations is that by the state of Pennsylvania. See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d
1042 (Pa. 1997). Earlier, the Seventh Circuit also embraced the universal demand
requirement for derivative suits, but was reversed by the Supreme Court. See
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991), rev'g 908 F.2d 1338 (7th
Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court held that unless the federal statute provides other-
wise, the federal court should defer to state law when determining whether such
demand is required. See id. at 96-97.
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a substantial economic interest in the firm such that he will
diligently oversee the suit's progress or, most importantly, its
settlement.92
Both the class action and the derivative suit, however,
may easily lose their public character through weaknesses in
the settlement process. Though the lead plaintiff provision in
the securities class action and the demand requirement confer
a public status on their suit's plaintiff, weaknesses in the set-
tlement ritual prevent the shareholder suit from securing a
position as a mechanism for vindicating public norms.
The weak incentives for the attorneys and their clients to
aggressively pursue the representative suit to trial are well
recognized.93 With the exception of the lead plaintiff provision
for securities class action, there is no legal requirement that
the representative suit plaintiff have a substantial financial
interest in the suit's successful prosecution. Lacking such an
interest, the plaintiff bears little of the consequences if the suit
produces either adverse consequences to the corporation or
yields insubstantial awards to its intended beneficiaries, name-
ly, fellow class members or the derivative suit corporation. A
further financial firewall between the suit's plaintiff and its
adverse effects is the contingent fee arrangement that holds
the plaintiff harmless for the litigation costs of a misguided
suit. Because of the contingent fee arrangement, any possible
adverse impact of an ill-advised suit is not likely to rein in the
maverick plaintiff. Moreover, the presence of a contingency fee
arrangement separates the plaintiff from the suit's counsel.
Further, the plaintiffs counsel enjoys a strategic advantage
2 Indeed, modern pleading allows the derivative suit plaintiff to join an indi-
vidual claim with the derivative suit claim, a result that can easily pose conflicts
of interest between her interests as an individual litigant and as a representative
of the corporation's cause of action. Thus, in Clark v. Lomas & Nettleson Financial
Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), the derivative suit plaintiff successfully opposed
the corporation's settlement of the suit with its defendants because that settlement
did not make provisions for the plaintiffs personal suit against the defendants.
See Kenneth W. Kossoff, Director Independence and Derivative Suit Settlements,
1983 DuKE L.J. 645 (1983). The demand requirement provides a means to consider
the suit's merits but not the plaintiffs vigilance during the suit's prosecution.
Moreover, the demand requirement does not address the plaintiffs ability to repre-
sent claims that technically are not before the court but which, under Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), discussed infra, may be
included in the terms of the settlement.
" See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 47, at 671-77.
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vis-A-vis the suit's defendants in aggressively pursuing risky
claims. While the defendant's focus is upon the risk posed by a
single suit, the plaintiffs attorney assesses a particular suit in
light of a portfolio of suits being prosecuted by its office. Tip-
ping the strategic balance further in favor of the plaintiffs
counsel is that while the defendant assesses outcomes in terms
of its overall liability exposure, the plaintiffs counsel's assess-
ment is the much smaller incremental cost of pursuing the suit
and negotiations to the next level.9 4
The defendants are not, however, without their own ad-
vantages. First, to the extent their litigation costs fall within
available D & 0 coverage, and perhaps even liberal indemnifi-
cation under applicable state law or provisions of their employ-
ment contracts, defendants are somewhat above the financial
consequences of the fray. This reality does, however, introduce
a new actor into the scenario, namely, the insurer. The natural
temptations of the defendants to clear their names and see
justice done may well be tempered by the terms of the D & 0
policy. The control of the issuers is even greater when the
policy includes a so-called "hammer clause" whereby insurer's
obligations to its insured can be limited to the settlement of-
fered by the plaintiff that was acceptable to the insurer but
which was rejected by the insured. 5 Furthermore, the possi-
bility of a judgment beyond the policy coverage has the same
salient impact on the defendant as the "wasting asset" feature
common to D & 0 policies has on the plaintiff." Plaintiffs
may gain nothing by pursuing a suit beyond a settlement offer
supported by the insurer if the insurer's responsibility under
the policy is limited to that offer. Moreover, the plaintiffs
counsel has little interest in prolonging the suit; most insur-
ance policies are in the nature of a wasting asset whereby
their coverage limits are eroded by defense costs so that any
sums from the insurance policy for the award of plaintiffs
" See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and
Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996).
11 THE WYA"r Co., 2 SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF TYPICAL PROVISIONS OF D & 0
POLICIES § 4.04, at 9 (1993).
96 D & 0 policies commonly provide a fixed maximum coverage for all costs
related to the suit against the insurer. Therefore, as the defendants' attorneys'
fees increase with the passage of time and efforts related to the suit's defense, the
funds for settlement provided by the policy are reduced pro tanto.
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counsel fees is what remains after the plaintiffs adversaries
have been compensated. This is a point missed by neither the
plaintiff nor the insurer, especially when the corporation and
other named defendants have insufficient funds to cover any
resulting settlement or judgment. Finally, both the plaintiffs
counsel and the insurer are well aware of the law of diminish-
ing returns; an early settlement for a known amount is valued
more highly than a potentially larger judgment discounted by
the time and riskiness of a trial.
No one had the pulse of the settlement process better than
the late Judge Henry Friendly, whose insights are helpful in
assessing the settlement ritual:
There can be no blinking at the fact that the interests of the plain-
tiff in a stockholder's derivative suit and of his attorney are by no
means congruent .... The plaintiffs financial interest is in his
share of the total recovery less what may be awarded to counsel,
simpliciter; counsel's financial interest is in the amount of the award
to him less the time and effort needed to produce it. A relatively
small settlement may well produce an allowance bearing a higher
ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger recovery obtained
only after extensive discovery, a long trial and an appeal. The risks
in proceeding to trial vary even more essentially. For the plaintiff, a
defendant's judgment may mean simply the defeat of an expectation,
often of relatively small amount; for his lawyer it can mean the loss
of years of costly effort by himself and his staff.97
In the face of such weak incentives to pursue the com-
plaint or defense aggressively, it is natural that settlements
are the predominant outcome of those shareholder suits that
survive pretrial motions. In another opinion, Judge Friendly
reminds us that the settlement hearing is the ritual corrupted
by weak incentives:
Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stock-
holders link arms with their former adversaries to defend the joint
handiwork-as is vividly shown here where the stockholders' general
counsel sometimes opposed [the objectors'] efforts to gain informa-
tion, although the settlement so vigorously defended before the Ref-
eree would have produced less than a quarter as much cash for
Allegheny, $700,000, as the $3,000,000 ultimately secured. 8
Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972).




Judge Friendly's observations enshroud the shareholder
suit in a cynical veil. They project, perhaps aptly, that repre-
sentative suits at the settlement stage succumb to their
attorneys' utility curves so that neither compensatory nor de-
terrent objectives guide their resolution. Stated differently,
settlements are lawyer and insurance driven. They do not
reflect the broader private interest of the class or corporation,
or, for that matter, the public objective of deterrence. Against
this background, we can surmise that whatever opprobrium or
public condemnation the shareholder suit directs toward the
suit's defendants is undermined by the hollowness of the con-
demnation embodied in the suit's settlement. Was this a base-
less action to extort an insurance-funded settlement or was it a
-meritorious suit quickly settled before the wasting asset, qua
insurance policy, was depleted by defense costs? Adding to our
malaise is the realization that few settlements are rejected by
the courts99 and that there is little evidence of settlements
where the officer and directors who have misbehaved contrib-
ute substantially personally toward the settlement fund in
substantial amounts.'00
We also should appreciate the overall reluctance of the
court to disturb the settlement before it. Here we should note
that Judge Friendly's quote in Saylor, the first quote above,
was in an opinion in which the panel on whose behalf he craft-
ed the majority opinion approved the derivative suit settlement
over the objection of the suit's plaintiff. Saylor reflected the
panel's opinion that the objecting plaintiff did not fully appreci-
ate the costs and benefits of the suit's continuance in light of
the present value of the settlement before the court. Might
Judge Friendly have doubted his own certitude in Saylor on
the basis of his powerful insight in Allegheny Corp.? Lacking
"9 See Berger & Pomeroy, supra note 22, at 9. There are some hopeful develop-
ments here. See, e.g., Weiser v. Grace, 216 N.Y. L.J. 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (in-
stitutional investor was permitted to intervene to question why settlement was
occuring after very limited discovery by the suit's counsel and why settlement did
not include pecuniary award to the corporation).
10 For an illustration of a rare instance where the settlement included recovery
from the individual defendant, see Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice Int'l Holdings,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 13950, 1997 WL 305829 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (albeit, the
recovery was from the estate of the former CEO and at the instance of a settle-
ment supported by the corporation's special litigation committee).
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true adversaries at the moment of settlement, how is a court to
assess the adequacy and overall fairness of the settlement
before it? With the pressures of its docket, the limited resourc-
es a court can employ to retain masters to review a settlement,
and the absence of adversaries, not only do courts rarely reject
settlements but often they do not closely review the
settlement's terms in light of the suit's merits. Perhaps the fol-
lowing statement regarding shareholder suits reflects accurate-
ly the position of most courts called upon to review a settle-
ment: "[TIhe court starts from the familiar axiom that a bad
settlement is almost always better than a good trial."''
Further tainting the settlement process as an important
ritual is the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Epstein °2 (Epstein 1), arising out of alleged
misconduct on the part of MCA, Inc. directors in response to
Matsushita Electric Industrial Company's tender offer for
MCA. The defendants' actions produced parallel suits, one a
class action in federal district court alleging violations of the
Williams Act and the other, a suit brought in the Delaware
Chancery Court alleging the MCA directors breached their
fiduciary duty to MCA shareholders by failing to obtain the
best price in the acquisition. Each of the suits was prosecuted
by different sets of lawyers, but the class members overlapped
substantially.'3 The federal district court dismissed the
suit.' While that suit was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a
settlement of the Delaware suit was approved by the Delaware
court.10 5 The Delaware settlement was unsuccessfully in-
101 In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd., 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
102 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
103 The class action filed in Delaware alleged that various MCA officers and
directors had breached their fiduciary duties to the shareholders with the effect of
depriving them of the best price for their shares; the class action filed in federal
court alleged the MCA shareholders who had tendered their shares to Matsushita
were entitled to the higher price per share it had paid to MCA's chairman and
chief operating officer. See id. at 370.
... See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the dis-
trict court's refusal to certify the class, denial of plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
1o5 See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholder Litig., Civ. A. No. 1174, 1993 WL 43024
(Del. Ch. Feb. 16, 1993), af'd., 633 A.2d 370 (Del. 1993). Earlier, the Delaware
Chancery Court had refused to approve a settlement because it believed the feder-
al claims had "substantial merit" and that the settlement before it was "illusion-
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voked by the defendants before the Ninth Circuit, which re-
versed the district court and granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. °6 The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit, holding that full faith and credit must be ac-
corded the state court's approval of the settlement."7 It
reached this conclusion even though the Delaware state court
settlement released the Williams Act claims for which the
federal courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction.
The notice of the Delaware settlement did not prompt the
federal class action plaintiffs either to opt out of the Delaware
class action or to object to its terms.0 8 Instead they contin-
ued to press their federal claims, even after the Supreme
Court's refusal to disturb the Delaware settlement. In Epstein
v. MCA, Inc."°9 (Epstein I), a divided"' Ninth Circuit panel
held that the earlier Delaware settlement of the federal claims
arising from the takeover of MCA violated due process because
their claimants were not adequately represented before the
Delaware court:
It was plainly in the best interest of counsel to settle the federal
claims at any price. For them, any settlement was better than no
settlement because settlement was the only way they could make
any money on the federal claims-indeed, given that the state claims
were essentially worthless, it was the only way that the Delaware
counsel could get any compensation at all.m
Subsequently, on rehearing, a reconstituted, albeit divided
court, in Epstein III, withdrew its opinion in Epstein II and
ary" because it provided only a modest modification of MCA's poison pill with the
only financial award being the $1 million to be paid to class counsel. See In re
MCA, Inc. Shareholder Litig., 598 A.2d 687, 696 (Del. Ch. 1991). The final Dela-
ware settlement did provide an overall $2 million fund out of which class counsel's
fees would be paid so that the ultimate recovery by class members would not be
greater than a few cents per share. See In re MCA, 1993 WL 43024, at *4.
106 See Eptstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1995).
'o' See Matsushita Electric, 516 U.S. at 373.
106 There were, however, objectors to the settlement who claimed the settlement
was collusive and therefore harmful to the class members. The objectors, however,
were not the individuals that represented the securities claims that were being
prosecuted in the federal court.
'09 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997).
... Circuit Judge O'Scannlain dissented, reasoning that because the issue of
adequacy of counsel had been raised before the Delaware court by objectors other
than the federal class action plaintiffs, all members of that class were barred from
relitigating the issue of adequacy. See id. at 1259 (O'Scannlain, C.J., dissenting).
... Id. at 1250.
... Epstein v. MCA, Inc., No. 92-55675, 1999 WL 359511 (9th Cir. June 7,
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replaced it with a decision in which the majority concluded
that the Supreme Court in Epstein I had addressed the ade-
quacy of representation issues so that the plaintiffs were
barred from relitigating that issue.
Epstein I and Epstein II are stark reminders that class
litigation is lawyer driven and that the law and the courts
provide too few restraints on such a view. The cold facts of
attorney self-interest set forth in Epstein I do not become less
stark because of the conclusions reached in Epstein III; the
settlement process failed and failed badly in Epstein L This is
not to suggest the primacy of Epstein II to Epstein III. We may
well view Epstein I as merely substituting one type of forum
shopping-that of seeking a hospitable court where a collateral
attack on the global settlement was approved by another
court-for the type of forum shopping legitimized by Epstein
L... Epstein II weakens the policy of finality and federalism
which underlies the Full Faith and Credit Clause," but also
reflects the seductive litigation environment, which permits
such self-interest to occur. At the same time, we justifiably
fear a world in which such intejurisdictional competition
among competing teams of plaintiff's lawyers could occur with-
out there being a basis to question the grounds for concluding
there was adequate representation of the various classes' mem-
bers in the global settlement."5 Though there are many pos-
sible solutions,"6 the most fundamental point is to recognize
1999).
1 See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy"
in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 784
(1998).
... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (the implementing
statute); William T. Allen, Finality of Judgements in Class Actions: A Comment on
Epstein v. MCA., Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149 (1998).
.. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "Epstein II: Adequacy v. Finality, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 29, 1998, at 5.
116 The main question will be whether the adequacy issue has been fully ex-
plored. Epstein III resolved this by deference to what it believed the Supreme
Court decided in Epstein L For arguments asserting that if there were no inter-
vening Supreme Court decision, a collateral attack would still be possible, see, for
example, Kahan & Silberman, supra note 113; Geoffrey P. Miller, Full Faith and
Credit to Settlements in Overlapping Class Actions: A Reply to Professors Kahan
and Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1175-76 (1998) (addressing the three part
inquiry on whether class had opportunity to challenge the adequacy of representa-
tion, whether counsel was disabled in Epstein III from litigating the claims that
were the subject of the challenge in the second forum, and, if so disabled, whether
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that the cause of this problem is Epstein I: rules that inher-
ently lead to forum shopping, as Epstein I does, are harmful
and lead to more harmful results. Commentators have long
recognized the harmful effects of state courts entertaining
global settlements. This effects a reverse auction whereby the
suit's defendants seek cooperative plaintiffs' lawyers to enter
into settlements in favorable state courts for amounts that are
substantially below the suit's fair settlement value.11
Epstein I legitimizes such harmful forum and plaintiff shop-
ping and thus weakens the ritual of settlement.
Settlement is an important ritual in the life and image of
the shareholder suit. Unfortunately, it is a ritual that appears
to confirm all that is wrong with the shareholder suit: settle-
ment procedures systematically nurture, indeed reinforce, the
attorney-driven tendencies of shareholder suits. This occurs
through perfunctory review of both the ends served by settle-
ment, and, most notably, of whether the settlement is a fair
conclusion of the issues raised in the suit and the relative
culpability of the suit's defendants.
II. ENHANCING THE SOCIAL MEANING OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS
Ambiguation, tying, and ritual currently weaken the social
influence of the shareholder suit. On the other hand, the above
review found important strengthening inhibitions for share-
holder suits in their procedural requirements that fostered
court screening of the suit's merits, as well as inhibitions that
prevail in D & 0 policies and state indemnity provisions. This
section considers strategies that can be pursued to reverse the
negative effects of those forces that weaken the social meaning
of shareholder suits so that the shareholder suit is more likely
to be viewed as an instrument that affirms desirable norms in
the corporate setting.
there was additional indicia that attorney did not fairly represent the class).
117 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-72 (1995).
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A. Reorienting the Judiciary's Focus
The most apparent error courts make is elevating compen-
sation over deterrence in defining the mission of the derivative
suit. This concern also arises with respect to class actions
where the preoccupation in approving settlements is the extent
the settlement makes the class members whole. Courts instead
should reverse their orientation so that their examination of
the shareholder's standing to initiate a derivative suit and
their approval of settlements emphasizes the public character
of the norms raised by the suit.
Useful guidance in understanding the purpose of this new
emphasis is provided by Pennsylvania, which liberalized the
contemporaneous ownership requirement to confer standing to
bring a derivative suit when necessary to avoid the injustice of
a serious wrong to the corporation going unredressed."8 Oth-
er departures from the strict contemporaneous ownership re-
quirement condition such liberalization on there being no pub-
lic disclosure of the wrongdoing before the plaintiff acquired
his shares. This, however, carries forward the concern of
avoiding unjust enrichment to the plaintiff rather than pre-
venting the defendant from being unjustly enriched by retain-
ing her ill-gotten gains.' Certainly, the present retention of
the contemporaneous ownership requirement is an important
commitment to the compensatory orientation of the derivative
suit and obscures the deeper concern of why such suits exist at
all and who the most adequate representative is for the suit.
In contrast, an approach such as that taken in Pennsylvania
invites early consideration of the important public character of
derivative suits.
Though standing for class actions does not pose the same
problem as it does for derivative suits, there continues to be a
need to underscore the deterrence features of the class actions.
As seen earlier, few settlements of securities class actions call
upon the defendants to contribute to the award to the class;
settlements are paid by the employer or, where recklessness is
alleged, fall within an available insurance policy. This is not
1,8 See 15 PA. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1782(b) (Purdon 1995).




an important weakness in derivative suits if the award arises
from wilful or self-dealing behavior, but it is a problem when
the misconduct falls under the more benign charges of inatten-
tion or wastefulness. Deterrence is poorly served and the suit
is robbed of its public character when its defendants are not
called upon to make a significant contribution to the settle-
ment. At a minimum, settlement procedures should regularly
require as part of the court's approval an affirmative finding as
to why the individual actors were not required to contribute
toward the settlement. Here the courts should consider the
insights provided by the American Law Institute in its corpo-
rate governance project, which embraced a liability ceiling for
directors and officers equal to the defendant's annual compen-
sation from the corporation."' The courts could include with-
in their finding why the directors or officers were not called
upon to contribute to the suit's settlement by an amount at
least equal to their most recent year's compensation from the
corporation. To be sure, such a new dimension to settlement
procedures is likely to prolong suits without increasing the
amount of the overall settlement. Complaints along these lines
can easily be seen as merely documenting the unfortunate set
of incentives that predominate for shareholder suits that rob
the suits of their public and deterrent effects. In this regard,
courts should address these weak incentives by increasing the
fees to be awarded plaintiffs counsel when the defendants
have made a non-trivial contribution to the overall settlement.
Correlatively, settlements that, without convincing explana-
tion, fail to extract non-trivial contributions from the defen-
dants and do not adequately protect against the defendant's
recouping her contribution through insurance, indemnity or
other arrangements should include a visible penalty in the
court's determination of the attorneys' fees it will award.
12' See ALI, supra note 26, at § 7.19. This provision of the ALI is in one sense
less generous than the immunity shield for corporate directors common in most
state statutes today which authorize provisions in the articles of incorporation that
provide full immunity, rather than only immunity above a ceiling amount, for non-
willful misconduct. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Director's Liability,
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 297-310 (1988) (reviewing the various approaches the states
have taken in drafting their immunity provisions). The ALI approach is broader
than most state statutes because it also authorizes the articles of incorporation to
extend immunity to officers.
[Vol. 65: 1
SOCIAL MEANING OF SHAREHOLDER SUITS
B. Confirming the Public Nature of Shareholder Suits
Prosecuting shareholder suits is a risky business for which
the plaintiff's attorney must receive large rewards in order to
avoid poor or under representation. Though incentives, as
suggested above, can be tweaked to accomplish fairly targeted
objectives, such as extracting from the individual defendant
some contribution toward the settlement, it remains likely that
the overall incentives of shareholder suits will continue to
cause them to be lawyer driven. Assuming this is the case,
then the role of the law should be to direct the suits in such a
way as to increase their stature.
The easiest step for more closely harnessing the derivative
suit to the corporate interest it represents is for the courts to
invigorate the long dormant requirement that the suit's repre-
sentative be an adequate one. Borrowing from the lead plain-
tiff provision introduced by the 1995 Reform Act, the derivative
suit court should actively seek one or more shareholders to
serve as advisors to the court on matters related to the selec-
tion and retention of class counsel. This change, however, must
confront the legitimate fear that a lead plaintiff is armed with
the power to substitute counsel for those that initiated the
suit. The concern here is that if counsel could easily be sup-
planted, the attorney will be reluctant to invest his time and
money in the many activities that are necessary to file a com-
plaint. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision may have the unin-
tended consequence of reducing the deterrent effects of deriva-
tive suits by reducing the incentives for attorneys to pursue
events that suggest misbehavior by company executives. Simi-
larly, the lead plaintiff provision may cause the complaint's
allegations to be poorly supported because the attorney is un-
willing to invest heavily in a preliminary investigation of the
facts until finally chosen as the suit's attorney. Courts could
pursue several strategies to address these concerns. For exam-
ple, the court should, in its consideration of who should repre-
sent the action, give substantial attention to the overall quality
of the filing attorney's efforts in preparing and pleading the
case. Thus, any recommendation by the lead plaintiff that
another attorney should be selected to represent the action
should address the quality of representation the attorney will
provide. Here the court should be very reluctant to substitute
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counsel if it has been satisfied with the thoroughness of the
preparation and pleadings submitted to date by the filing coun-
sel. Even if it believes new counsel should be appointed, it can
call for quantum meruit compensation for the suit's filing at-
torney if the suit is successfully concluded by new counsel. The
important objective is to more closely link the suit's prosecu-
tion to the public norm that is to be vindicated on behalf of the
derivative suit corporation. If the court fails to do this, then
much like the passive plaintiff in securities class actions, the
court will merely be confirming that the true combatants are
the attorneys and not the public interest that underlies the
corporation's or investor's rights that give rise to the suit.
A further reform that would raise the public stature of the
shareholder suit is to accord to non-intervening shareholders
or class members greater rights to review settlements. The
standing of non-intervernors to pursue appeals in both deriva-
tive and class actions is a matter over which the circuits are
badly divided. 2' It is not uncommon for shareholders or class
members to seek review of a settlement, even though they
have not formally intervened in the shareholder suit. Not sur-
prisingly, the charge they raise on appeal is that the class or
derivative suit's lawyers have failed to achieve a settlement
that is in the best interest of their client. Sometimes these
disputes reflect the competing turf war of rival law firms, such
as occurred in Epstein I and I1. Thus, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Bolger,'22 two derivative suits-the Lazar action and the Taub
action-were initiated in response to the announcement that
Bell Atlantic would refund $40 million to settle a consumer
fraud action brought by the state of Pennsylvania. The defen-
dants moved to settle the Taub action, agreeing to make cer-
tain disclosures in their forthcoming proxy materials and to
employ new marketing and sales procedures. The proposed
settlement also provided for attorneys' fees not to exceed
$450,000. Lazar was among those objecting to the settlement.
The district court approved the settlement over the objections
of Lazar and 24 other Bell Atlantic shareholders. The court
.1 For a review of the positions among the circuits, see Timothy A. Duffy, The
Appealability of Class Action Settlements by Unnamed Parties, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
933, 935-40 (1993).
'2 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993).
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held that the shareholders in a derivative suit may pursue a
review in the appellate court, even though they did not inter-
vene in the suit. It was sufficient that Lazar had objected at
the settlement hearing.'23 More frequently, however, the com-
plaint in such cases is not raised among warring sets of clients
and their respective lawyers, but centers upon the weak incen-
tives surrounding the suit's attorney that may tempt her to
support an unfair settlement.
Intervention into a shareholder suit is not without its
procedural difficulties. 24 We ought not to deny to non-inter-
venors standing to appeal on the ground that they could have
easily qualified themselves to pursue an appeal. And, certainly
any rule that restricts the ability of a shareholder or class
member to appeal the suit enhances the named party's control
over the settlement. At the same time, without the formal
recognition of the court (as would occur when a party was
permitted to intervene), the non-party appellant possesses the
same stature as the plaintiff in Epstein II to challenge on ap-
peal a court-approved settlement whether appeals may be
pursued by non-intervenors or only by intervenors. Each posi-
tion reinforces the image that the contest is among the attor-
neys and not against the corporate officials who have misbe-
haved.'26 Nevertheless, according rights to obtain review of
settlements to non-intervening objectors would provide both an
important ritual and an inhibition for settlement procedures.
According standing to appeal the settlement of a share-
holder suit to non-intervenors who had raised their objections
to the settlement before the trial court would recognize the
substantial public nature of the shareholder suit. Indeed, such
a rule would likely encourage objectors to step forward so as to
establish their standing to seek an appeal of an arguably un-
fair settlement. Moreover, according such non-intervenors
standing to appeal would provide a useful inhibition to the
" See id. at 1310. We might question whether a personal appearance at the
settlement hearing is required or whether it is sufficient to file a written objection
with the court. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 69 n.10 (2d Cir.
1982).
12 See Duffy, supra note 121, at 954 n.112.
1 See id. at 951.
125 Indeed, this was the policy justification invoked in Bell Atlantic to permit
non-intervenors to appeal. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 2 F.3d at 1309-10.
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suit's attorney proposing settlements that would not benefit
the interests of the class or derivative suit shareholders. The
need for such an inhibition was the basis raised in the petition
for certiorari in California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem v. Felzen." The derivative suit grew out of more than
$190 million Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) had paid to settle
various civil and criminal antitrust cases for its alleged price
fixing activities. The derivative suits alleged ADM's officers
and directors had breached their fiduciary obligations in con-
nection with the antitrust violations and sought to recover
$190 million. A proposed settlement of the suit under which an
$8 million award would be recovered by ADM was submitted
to the derivative suit court. Over the objections of the Califor-
nia Public Employees Retirement System and the Florida State
Board of Administration, the district court approved the settle-
ment. Without opinion, the justices divided evenly,2 ' thereby
affirming the Seventh Circuit's decision to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that only parties could pursue an appeal.'29 In
their petition for certiorari, the funds argued that "the prohibi-
tion of appeals by nonparty shareholders eliminates a critical
safeguard against collusive derivative settlements that benefit
only plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants." The power of such a
party to challenge the settlement on appeal would most easily
be recognized in suits where the suit's plaintiff did not have a
substantial financial interest in the suit that would qualify her
as a most adequate plaintiff.
The Supreme Court should stop supporting plaintiff and
forum shopping by reversing Epstein I. Even after the passage
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),
which preempts the jurisdiction of state courts over securities
fraud class actions involving large public companies, Epstein I
retains its former vitality. SLUSA preserves the so-called "Del-
aware carve out" which permits suits based on disclosure obli-
gations arising under state law to continue to be filed in state
courts. Thus, even after SLUSA, state law claims, such as that
brought in Delaware against the MCA directors and officers,
may be brought in state court, and the settlements of those
12 67 U.S.L.W. 4073, 4090 (Jan. 26, 1999).
" See id.
.2 See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998).
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actions can extend to federal securities claims that could not
be brought in state court. As seen earlier, Epstein I promotes
the harmful image that shareholder suits are attorney driven
and are characterized by attorneys shopping for a forum that
will maximize their utility curve.13 As reasoned earlier, the
appropriate position should be one that promotes finality with
respect to the first decision. Epstein I does not accomplish this
because it invites the very complaint that made Epstein 11
credible, namely, that lawyers can never be an adequate repre-
sentative of a class of claims that the lawyer did not and could
not have raised in that court. To hold otherwise is to institu-
tionalize the view that shareholder suits are about lawyers and
not their claimants. As such, the ritual of where suits may be
settled poorly serves the expressive value of shareholder suits.
3 Note also that Epstein II reinforces this image because it encourages the
attorneys disfavored in the competing forum to pursue their quest in a more satis-
factory forum. It is not clear in all cases that the antidote for Epstein ITs brand
of forum shopping will be the conclusions reached in Epstein IL It remains to be
seen whether, in other disputes, the court will be faced with the same type of
record as that in Epstein I1, which supported a finding that the question of ade-
quacy of representation was resolved in the prior proceeding involving the same
plaintiffs and their lawyers.
1999]

